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Abstract 
 
We examine whether internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management. 
Internal governance refers to the process through which key subordinate executives provide 
checks and balances in the organization and affect corporate decisions. Using the number of 
years to retirement to capture key subordinate executives’ incentives and using their 
compensation relative to CEO compensation to capture their influence within the firm, we find 
that the extent of real earnings management decreases with key subordinate executives’ horizon 
and influence. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the impact of internal governance is more 
important for firms with more complex operations where key subordinate executives’ 
contribution is higher, is enhanced by the effectiveness of other governance mechanisms, and is 
stronger in the post-SOX period, when real earnings management is likely more prevalent. The 
results are also robust to controlling for potential endogeneity concerns and to using alternative 
measures of internal governance. This paper contributes to the literature by examining how 
internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management and by shedding light on how 
the members of the management team work together in shaping financial reporting quality.  
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1 Introduction 
We examine whether internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management.1 
Internal governance refers to the process through which key subordinate executives provide 
checks and balances in the organization and affect corporate decisions.2 We focus on key 
subordinate executives, or specifically the top five executives with the highest compensation 
other than the CEO, because we hypothesize that they are the most likely group of employees 
that have both the incentive and the ability to influence the CEO in corporate decisions. As 
argued in Acharya et al. (2011), key subordinate executives have strong incentives not to take 
actions that increase short-term performance at the expense of long-term firm value. This 
tradeoff between current and future firm value is particularly salient in the case of real earnings 
management as compared to accrual earnings management because overproduction and cutting 
of R&D expenditures are costly and can reduce the long-term value of the firm (e.g., Graham et 
al. 2005). Thus we focus on real earnings management in this paper.  
The motivation for the research question is two-fold. First, the majority of the papers in the 
literature explicitly or implicitly assume that the CEO is the sole decision maker for financial 
reporting quality, which includes both accrual and real earnings management.3 Focusing only on 
the CEO might not provide a complete picture because firm management is typically a shared 
                                                            
1 Following Roychowdhury (2006), we define real earnings management as “management actions that deviate from 
normal business practices, undertaken with the primary objective of meeting certain earnings thresholds (p.336).” Of 
course, real earnings management could also be undertaken to achieve other earnings management objectives at the 
same time – to increase bonus, to smooth earnings, to avoid covenant violations etc. Some papers in the literature 
refer to “real earnings management” as “real activities management.”  
2 We use the term “internal governance” to be consistent with some of the closely related studies (e.g., Acharya et al. 
2011). In some studies (e.g., Gillan 2006), board monitoring is also referred to as internal corporate governance and 
the monitoring by shareholders, such as institutional investors and blockholders, is referred to as external corporate 
governance. In this paper, we follow Brickley and Zimmerman’s (2010) advice and do not distinguish between 
internal versus external governance. We refer to governance mechanisms other than the monitoring by the key 
subordinate executives broadly as “other governance mechanisms.”  
3 Some papers pool all top five executives covered in the ExecuComp database together and examine their collective 
influence on financial reporting (e.g., Cheng and Warfield 2005). In such cases, it is unclear whether the 
documented effect is driven by the CEOs or the CEOs and CFOs. The distinct impact of other executives is not 
identified in such analyses.  
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effort of all top executives (Finkelstein 1992). Recently the literature starts to examine how the 
characteristics of CFOs affect the quality of financial reporting (e.g., Jiang et al. 2010; Feng et al. 
2011). However, the impact of other executives has been largely overlooked. While CFOs are 
primarily responsible for the preparation of financial statements and the quality of accruals in 
financial reporting, other executives play a more important role in real activities such as sales 
promotions, production volumes and R&D expenditures. As discussed briefly below and in detail 
in Section 2, recent studies argue that subordinate executives usually have longer decision 
horizons and they can influence corporate decisions through various means. We hypothesize that 
differential preferences arising from differential horizons can affect the extent of real earnings 
management.  
Second, while there are studies focusing on the impact of various corporate governance 
mechanisms on corporate decisions (e.g., board independence and institutional ownership), little 
is known about whether there are checks and balances within the management team. This lack of 
knowledge is an important omission because control is not just imposed from the top-down or 
from the outside, but also from the bottom-up (Fama 1980).  
Key subordinate executives usually care more about long-term firm value than the CEO for 
several important reasons. First, as argued in Acharya et al. (2011), some of these executives 
have the desire to become the CEO in the future. As candidates for the CEO position in the 
future, key subordinate executives care about cash flows that the firm can generate in the future, 
which are in turn a function of the firm’s current investments. As a result, these executives are 
less likely to sacrifice long-term investments to meet short-term earnings targets. Second, key 
subordinate executives have more to lose from corporate underperformance. They are usually 
younger, have more remaining years of employment and thus care more about their reputation in 
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the job market. Prior research indicates that corporate operating failures due to a lack of long-
term investments or financial reporting failures have a disproportionate impact on subordinate 
executives’ welfare than on CEOs’ (e.g., Feng et al. 2011). 
Not only do key subordinate executives have incentives to increase long-term firm value, 
they also have the means to influence corporate decisions toward their preferences. Prior 
research argues that because key subordinate executives’ effort is an important determinant of 
current cash flows and the CEO’s welfare, the CEO will consider key subordinate executives’ 
preferences when making important corporate decisions; otherwise, subordinate executives 
might shirk, hence reducing current and future cash flows and the CEO’s welfare (Allen and 
Gale 2000; Acharya et al. 2011).  
The above discussion implies that the effectiveness of internal governance depends on the 
decision horizon of key subordinate executives and the influence they have on the CEO. In this 
paper, we use the number of years until retirement age (assumed to be 65) to capture these 
executives’ decision horizon and the level of their compensation relative to the CEO’s 
compensation to capture their influence on the CEO. We expect that the longer the horizon and 
the higher the relative compensation, the more effective is internal governance, and the lower the 
extent of real earnings management. Of course, subordinate executives might have the same 
incentives as the CEO to increase short-term performance at the expense of long-term value. Or, 
subordinate executives might be afraid of the consequences of disobeying the CEO’s order (e.g., 
being demoted or fired) and hence do not exert discipline on the CEO.4 In addition, it is possible 
that the key subordinate executives are in a tournament or competition for the CEO’s job with 
external candidates; as a result, they could undertake real earnings management to increase short-
                                                            
4 See Feng et al. (2011) for evidence on the role of powerful CEOs in influencing CFOs to undertake material 
accounting manipulations. 
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term earnings and/or to curry favor with the CEO who likely plays an important role in selecting 
his/her successor. These possibilities introduce tension into our research question and thus 
whether internal governance can effectively reduce the extent of real earnings management is an 
empirical question.  
We test our hypothesis using 8,061 firm-year observations from the S&P 1500 firms in the 
period 1993-2011. The empirical results are consistent with our prediction. We find that the 
extent of real earnings management decreases with subordinate executives’ horizon and relative 
compensation. The results hold after we control for CEO and firm characteristics that might 
affect the extent of real earnings management (e.g., CEO horizon, CEO compensation structure, 
firm age, analyst coverage, firm size, firm performance, leverage, firm growth opportunities, 
other governance mechanisms), when we use alternative measures of internal governance, and 
when we exclude the CFO from the list of key subordinate executives.  
To corroborate the inference from the main analyses, we conduct a series of cross-sectional 
analyses. First, key subordinate executives’ ability to influence the CEO’s decision hinges on 
their contribution to firm performance and we argue that their contribution is greater when the 
firm’s operations are more complex. Accordingly, we expect that the impact of internal 
governance is higher when operation complexity is higher. We use industry R&D intensity and a 
common factor based on the number of geographical segments, geographical sales concentration, 
and foreign sales to capture the complexity of a firm’s operations. We find results consistent with 
our prediction that the impact of internal governance is higher when operation complexity is 
higher. Second, we find that the effect of internal governance is stronger when board monitoring 
is more effective (higher board independence) and when institutional ownership is higher. This 
result indicates that other effective governance mechanisms can enhance subordinate executives’ 
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ability to influence the CEO’s decisions. 
We also conduct a series of additional tests to ensure the robustness of our results and to 
provide additional insights. First, we examine the impact of internal governance on accrual 
earnings management. Ex-ante, whether non-CFO subordinate executives can influence the 
extent of accrual earnings management is unclear. On one hand, key subordinate executives do 
not play a direct role in accrual management because unlike the CFO, they are not directly 
involved in the financial reporting process. On the other hand, they likely have an important 
influence over the corporate culture and the overall corporate attitude toward earnings 
management. If the key subordinate executives focus on the long-term value of the firm, their 
preference might manifest in better financial reporting quality and less accrual-based earnings 
management. We do not find robust evidence that subordinate executives have a significant 
impact on the extent of accrual earnings management after considering the interrelationship 
between real and accrual earnings management, consistent with these executives playing a more 
limited role in the financial reporting process.  
Second, we recognize that our analyses might be subject to endogeneity concerns because 
firms’ internal governance is arguably endogenously determined. We mitigate this concern by 
using the lagged values of internal governance in all our analyses and including a set of control 
variables that are likely related with both internal governance and the extent of real earnings 
management. Our cross-sectional analyses also mitigate this concern because it is arguably 
harder for an omitted variable to explain both our main and cross-sectional findings. In an 
additional analysis, we use an instrumental variable approach to further control for potential 
endogeneity concerns of internal governance. Specifically, following related prior studies, we 
use the number of named executives in the proxy statement and an indicator for outside CEOs as 
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instruments in a 2SLS approach to address this issue. Our inferences remain the same.  
Third, in the main analyses, we use the relative compensation of the key subordinate 
executives to capture their ability to influence the CEO on key corporate decisions. In a 
sensitivity test, we use an alternative measure: whether the subordinate executives sit on other 
companies’ board. The inferences are unchanged. Fourth, we find that our results are stronger in 
the post-SOX period when real earnings management is likely more prevalent than in the pre-
SOX period. Lastly, in a falsification test, we find that internal governance is not correlated with 
the extent of real earnings management in a sample where we expect not to find results, further 
strengthening our main inference.    
This paper contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, this paper is the first to 
examine the association between internal governance and the extent of real earnings 
management. This examination is important as it sheds light on how the members of the 
management team work together and shape financial reporting. This paper differs from and 
complements studies on the impact of CFOs’ characteristics on accrual quality or the likelihood 
of earnings restatements/frauds by focusing on all key subordinate executives and by focusing on 
real earnings management.  
Second, our examination of internal governance helps provide a more complete picture of 
how firms work. Unlike prior research which generally views top executives as a unified team, 
this paper provides evidence that key subordinate executives can serve an important monitoring 
role and that effective internal governance can reduce the extent of CEOs’ myopic behavior. Our 
study answers Fama’s (1980) call for research on internal governance. He argues that while each 
manager is concerned with the performance of others in the firm and as a consequence, 
undertakes certain monitoring of other managers, both above or below, “less well appreciated, 
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however, is the monitoring that takes place from bottom to top” (p.293).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of prior 
research and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and data and presents the 
research design. Section 4 reports the main analysis of the impact of internal governance on the 
extent of real earnings management, and cross-sectional analyses. Section 5 reports additional 
analyses, and Section 6 concludes.  
 
2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Literature Review 
We rely and build on two steams of the earnings management literature: the impact of 
individual executives on financial reporting quality and real earnings management.  
One of the fundamental drivers of earnings management is the pressure on managers to 
deliver short-term performance that is used in contracting and firm valuation. See, for examples, 
DeFond and Park (1997) on the pressure related to job security, Matsunaga and Park (2001) on 
the pressure related to meeting earnings benchmarks, Stein (1988) on takeover pressure, and 
Bartov et al. (2002), Kasznik and McNichols (2002), and Bhojraj and Libby (2005) on the capital 
market pressure to deliver short-term performance. Given the vast literature on earnings 
management, we do not provide a detailed literature review here and we refer readers to the 
review papers that discuss in greater detail the demand for earnings management and how 
managers benefit from this activity (e.g., Schipper 1989; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Dechow and 
Skinner 2000; Fields et al. 2001; Dechow et al. 2010).5  
                                                            
5 While the literature focusses primarily on accrual-based earnings management, the argument on the demand for 
and the benefit (to managers) of earnings management apply to real earnings management as well. Indeed, the recent 
development of the real earnings management literature builds on prior studies of accrual-based earnings 
management. 
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A recent survey study, Dichev et al. (2013), concludes that “about 20% of firms manage 
earnings to misrepresent economic performance, and for such firms 10% of EPS is typically 
managed.” Using a different research methodology, Dyck et al. (2013) also conclude that 
earnings management and accounting frauds are prevalent.6 In sum, prior work has documented 
the incentive for and the existence of earnings management. 
Most prior studies tend to focus on the management team as a whole or solely on the CEO 
as the person(s) held primarily responsible for earnings management within the firm. Recently, 
the literature starts to examine the impact of CFOs on earnings quality. For example, Geiger and 
North (2006) isolate the impact of CFOs by focusing on the appointment of new CFOs. They 
find that the appointment of new CFOs is associated with a decrease in discretionary accruals 
and that the result is largely driven by new CFOs who are hired from outside. Focusing on CFO 
directors, Bedard et al. (2011) find that firms with CFOs who sit on their own board exhibit 
higher reporting quality (e.g., lower likelihood of internal control weaknesses, lower likelihood 
of restatements, and higher accruals quality). Ge et al. (2010) find that CFO style matters for 
various accounting choices, such as discretionary accruals, the likelihood of meeting or just 
beating earnings expectations, and the likelihood of restatements.7 
There are also studies contrasting the impact of CFOs’ incentives with that of CEOs’ 
incentives on earnings management. Jiang et al. (2010) focus on the impact of CFOs’ and CEOs’ 
                                                            
6 Whether the prevalence of myopic behavior implies widespread market inefficiency is an interesting question. It is 
certainly possible that myopic behavior, including earnings management, is due to market inefficiency; investors are 
naïve and fixate on reported earnings. However, myopic behavior can also occur even when the capital markets are 
efficient. Stein (1989) develops a model of inefficient managerial behavior in the face of a rational stock market. He 
shows that when investors are sophisticated, in equilibrium, investors rationally expect managers to engage in 
earnings management, which they do. In other words, if the market has rational expectations of earnings 
management behavior but cannot completely undo earnings management of individual firms, it is optimal for market 
participants to price the reported earnings by adjusting for the impact of earnings management. Given investors’ 
pricing behavior, managers find it optimal to manage earnings. 
7 Ge et al. (2010) capture the effect of CFO style by using a fixed effect model to track CFOs who work in multiple 
companies over their sample period. 
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equity incentives on earnings management. They find that the magnitude of accruals and the 
likelihood of meeting or just beating analysts’ forecast are more sensitive to CFOs’ than to 
CEOs’ equity incentives in the pre-SOX period. In contrast, Feng et al. (2011) find that while 
CEOs of firms that are involved in material accounting manipulations (manipulations that violate 
GAAP) have higher equity incentives than their counterparts in other firms, CFOs of these 
accounting manipulation firms have similar levels of equity incentives as their counterparts in 
other firms. Despite their lack of incentives, CFOs who are involved in material accounting 
manipulations suffer substantial losses. Feng et al. conclude that the direct financial gain is not 
the main motivation for CFOs to be involved in earnings manipulation. Rather, CFOs likely 
succumb to powerful CEOs’ pressure to manipulate financial statements. 
We extend this line of research by focusing on a broader set of key subordinate executives, 
including not only CFOs but also other top executives, and examine their impact on the extent of 
real earnings management. We focus on real earnings management because the tradeoff between 
increasing short-term performance and increasing long-term firm value is more salient for real 
earnings management than for accrual management. For example, cutting R&D expenditures 
now to meet current year’s earnings targets will lead to lower long-term investment and reduce 
the company’s ability to compete in the product markets and to generate profits in the future.  In 
addition, key subordinate executives have more direct control and influence over real activities, 
for example, R&D expenditures, production volumes, and sales decisions, than over accruals 
based earnings management.  
To our knowledge, ours is the first study that explicitly examines the impact of individual 
subordinate executives on the extent of real earnings management. The extant literature on real 
earnings management has focused primarily on documenting the existence of real earnings 
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management. For example, Graham et al. (2005) report that 80 percent of surveyed CFOs stated 
that, in order to deliver earnings, they would decrease research and development (R&D), 
advertising, and maintenance expenditures, while 55 percent said they would postpone a new 
project, both of which are real activities manipulation. Roychowdhury (2006) documents the 
existence of real earnings management in firms that meet or just beat earnings benchmarks. 
Cohen et al. (2008) find that the extent of real earnings management is higher in the post-SOX 
period than in the pre-SOX period. We extend this line of research by examining how internal 
governance affects the extent of real earnings management, complementing studies that examine 
the impact on real earnings management of other governance mechanisms, such as institutional 
ownership and board independence (e.g., Bushee 1998; Carcello et al. 2006; Zhao 2011).  
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1 Main Hypothesis  
In this section, we discuss why key subordinate executives have both the incentive and 
ability to provide monitoring and reduce the extent of real earnings management.  
As discussed above and studied in numerous prior studies, CEOs likely engage in earnings 
management to increase their compensation, to increase their job security, to meet earnings 
targets, and to reduce take-over threat. One of the fundamental drivers of earnings management 
is the pressure on CEOs to deliver short-term performance that is used in contracting and firm 
valuation. While it is possible that key subordinate executives are under similar or even greater 
pressure to deliver short-term performance, yet as compared to CEOs, key subordinate 
executives have longer horizons that induce them to care more about long-term firm value for 
three reasons. First, one of the career objectives of many key subordinate executives is to 
become the next CEO when the current CEO retires or resigns. As documented in Cremers and 
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Grinstein (2011), 68.6 percent of CEOs are insiders; in other words, in 68.6 percent of the CEO 
turnover cases, one of the key subordinate executives becomes the next CEO.8 As the potential 
CEO in the future, these subordinate executives care about the cash flows that the firm can 
generate in the future. Since a company’s performance depends critically on the capital stock 
(i.e., value enhancing assets), how the company performs when the subordinate manager 
becomes the CEO depends on the current capital investment. Thus, subordinate executives are 
hypothesized to care more about long-term investment than the CEO. As a result, these 
subordinate executives are less likely to support activities that sacrifice long-term positive NPV 
investments to meet short-term earnings targets.  
Second, subordinate executives have more to lose in the event of corporate 
underperformance and operational failures. Key subordinate executives are usually younger than 
the CEO. In our sample, they are four years younger at the sample median, and this difference 
represents a 44% increase in the number of years of remaining employment (i.e., the number of 
years until the assumed retirement age of 65). Their future compensation likely represents a 
larger proportion of their overall income and wealth, and potentially more importantly, they care 
more about their reputation in the job market. Being affiliated with corporate underperformance 
or operational failures, either due to earnings manipulation or a lack of long-term investments, 
has a larger impact on these subordinate executives’ welfare than on the CEO’s (e.g., Feng et al. 
2011).  
Third, Fama (1980) argues that in general, a manager’s outside opportunity wage depends 
on other managers’, including the CEO’s, actions and firm performance. This reputation effect 
                                                            
8 Based on data from ExecuComp, we find that 59.7% of the CEOs in our sample were promoted within the 
company. Within this group of CEOs, 36.0% were the Chief Operating Officer, 40.8% of them were the President, 
and 7.5% were the Vice President. These statistics confirm that inside-CEOs are generally selected from the set of 
key subordinate executives we study. 
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can motivate the key subordinate executives to be more long-term oriented and to exert 
monitoring on the CEO.  
The above discussion implies that subordinate executives have longer horizons and are less 
myopic than the CEO. The longer the subordinate executives’ horizon, the stronger their 
incentives not to sacrifice long-term value for short-term goals.  
Not only do subordinate executives have incentives, they also have the means to influence 
the CEO’s decision. Prior theoretical research argues that key subordinate executives can 
influence CEOs by threatening to work less (Acharya et al. 2011) or by not cooperating with the 
CEO (Allen and Gale 2000; Landier et al. 2009). By “working less” or “not cooperating,” these 
scholars mean that subordinate managers likely exert less effort if the CEO’s decision is not 
aligned with subordinate executives preferences. This is plausible because an individual’s effort 
level is usually unobservable and subordinate executives have the best information to decide the 
appropriate effort level. (This is the same reason why top executives are given performance-
based bonus and stock-based compensation, not just a fixed salary). The current CEO’s welfare 
depends on the cash flow in the current period, which is affected by the key subordinate 
executives’ effort levels.9 If the CEO does not consider the subordinate executives’ interests, 
subordinate executives can work less diligently, hence reducing the current cash flow and the 
CEO’s welfare. Anticipating this, it is in the best interest of the CEO to consider subordinate 
executives’ interests.  
Of course, subordinate executives in some firms are more powerful, or are more influential 
on their CEOs, than their counterparts in other firms. The more influential are the subordinate 
executives, the more effective their monitoring of the CEO.  
                                                            
9 The importance of these key subordinate executives is self-evident. In a recent study, Graham et al. (2013) find 
that only about 15% of the surveyed CEOs and CFOs indicate that the CEO is the sole-decision maker in their firms 
regarding important corporate decisions, such as M&A, capital allocation and investments. 
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Applying the above general discussion to the real earnings management setting, if the CEO 
chooses real activity manipulation that decreases long-term firm value, key subordinate 
executives will choose a lower effort level. Anticipating this, the CEO will be less likely to 
engage in real earnings management. In other words, if the CEO does not engage in real earnings 
management, then subordinate executives’ interest is aligned and they will work harder to 
improve both current and future firm performance. In addition, the CEO needs the subordinate 
executives’ cooperation to engage in real earnings management because subordinate executives 
are usually more informed than the CEO in their own functional areas. For example, the 
president in charge of production likely has more information about the supply of raw materials 
and the demand from customers. Hence, he or she will play an important role if the firm decides 
to overproduce in order to increase the current period’s earnings. Similarly, the executive in 
charge of R&D is better informed and can influence whether and how much the firm can reduce 
the current period’s R&D. That is, while the CEO has the formal authority to make the decision, 
subordinate executives have the real authority, e.g., effective control over the decisions, due to 
their information advantage (Aghion and Tirole 1997). As such, the CEO will take the 
subordinate executives’ preferences into consideration. 
Overall, the effectiveness of key subordinate executives’ influence in curbing myopic 
behavior depends on their horizon and their ability to influence CEOs’ decisions. The longer the 
horizon and the more influence the key subordinate executives have, the more effective the 
internal governance, and the less likely that the company will engage in real earnings 
management. Thus, our first hypothesis (in alternative form) is as follows:  
H1: The extent of real earnings management is negatively associated with the effectiveness 
of internal governance.  
 
As discussed below, we use key subordinate executives’ horizon (i.e., the number of years until 
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retirement) and their relative pay (i.e., the average pay of subordinate executives divided by CEO 
pay) to capture the effectiveness of internal governance.  
There are two critical assumptions underlying H1. First, we rely on prior research to argue 
that the CEO has incentives to increase short-term performance at the expense of long-term 
value, such as to increase job security (DeFond and Park 1997) and to increase compensation 
(e.g., Healy 1985; Cheng and Warfield 2005). One might argue that subordinate executives 
might be as myopic as the CEO. In addition, it is possible that the key subordinate executives are 
in a tournament or competition for the CEO’s position with external candidates. As a result, they 
might undertake real earnings management to increase short-term earnings and/or to curry favor 
with the CEO who likely plays a role in selecting his/her successor. If this is the case, we will not 
find results consistent with H1. Second, prior research indicates that key subordinate executives 
have the power to influence CEOs’ decisions. However, at the same time, CEOs have the power 
to demote or fire these subordinate executives. Job security concerns can motivate subordinates 
to cooperate with CEOs in carrying out myopic behavior (Feng et al. 2011). Of course, firing key 
subordinate executives because they do not engage in myopic behavior can backfire. Having 
nothing to lose after being fired, subordinate executives can become “whistle-blowers” and 
reveal the inappropriate behavior to the board, investors, and the press or seek legal action 
against the firm for inappropriate dismissal.10 Such potential outcome will deter CEOs from 
freely firing subordinate executives who choose not to engage in myopic behavior. Again, if 
subordinate executives have no influence on CEOs’ myopic behavior or if CEOs have no 
                                                            
10 Unlike accounting frauds, real earnings management practices are usually revealed to the press. However, there 
are cases where inappropriate practices are revealed to the SEC. For example, Ronald Sorisho, one of the divisional 
CFOs in Solectron, “files a whistleblower suit alleging that Solectron fired him for trying to force the company to 
write down substantial quantities of obsolete inventory (Dyck et al. 2010).” As quoted in Dyck et al. (2010),  
“Ronald Sorisho contends that he was fired on July 31 [2002] after spending several months unsuccessfully trying to 
persuade Solectron’s top management to write off $45 million of obsolete inventory at Solectron’s Technology 
Solution business unit.” 
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incentive to engage in earnings management, we will not find results consistent with H1. Thus, 
whether we find results consistent with H1 is an empirical question.  
2.2.2 Cross-sectional Analyses 
Variation in subordinate executives’ contribution 
One key assumption underlying H1 is that subordinate executives can influence corporate 
decisions to reflect their preferences. As discussed above, key subordinate executives can 
influence CEOs’ decision because their effort is critical to the performance of the company and 
CEOs rely on subordinate executives in generating current cash flows (Allen and Gale 2000; 
Landier et al. 2009; Acharya et al. 2011). However, key subordinate executives’ influence likely 
varies across firms. The more influential the key subordinate executives are in the firm’s 
operations, the stronger is the effect of internal governance. Because one of the fundamental 
reasons why key subordinate executives can influence CEOs’ decisions is their contribution to 
firm performance, the higher the subordinate executives’ contribution, the higher is their 
potential influence on CEOs (Finkelstein 1992; Acharya et al. 2011). Prior research indicates that 
complex firms are more difficult to manage and requires the collective efforts of all executives 
(e.g., Graham et al. 2013). We thus expect the impact of internal governance to be stronger in 
more complex firms than in other firms. Our next hypothesis (in alternative form) is as follows: 
H2: The effectiveness of internal governance in reducing the extent of real earnings 
management is stronger in more complex firms than in other firms. 
 
We discuss the proxy for firm complexity in the empirical section.  
Other governance mechanisms 
While we emphasize the impact of internal governance on the extent of real earnings 
management, it is important to understand how internal governance and other governance 
mechanisms interact in affecting the extent of real earnings management. Acharya et al. (2011) 
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analytically show that “a combination of internal governance and a rudimentary form of outside 
governance by shareholders can improve the efficiency of the firm dramatically (p. 691).” By 
“rudimentary form of outside governance by shareholders,” they refer to shareholders’ ability to 
take over the firm and replace the CEO if necessary. That is, the effectiveness of internal 
governance can be enhanced by the monitoring of shareholders who care about long-term value 
and have the ability to discipline the CEO if needed.11 Thus, we expect internal governance and 
other governance mechanisms to be complements.  
Relying on prior research, we focus on two commonly studied governance mechanisms 
that have the ability to discipline the CEO: the monitoring by the board of directors and by 
institutional shareholders. Numerous prior studies document that the effectiveness of board 
monitoring increases with board independence (e.g., Weisbach 1988; Klein 2002). The literature 
on institutional ownership finds that institutional investors are better monitors than other 
shareholders (e.g., Bushee 1998; Parrino et al. 2003; Chen et al. 2007). Thus, we predict that the 
effectiveness of internal governance increases with board independence and institutional 
ownership.12  
The above discussion leads to our last hypothesis (in alternative form): 
H3: The effectiveness of internal governance in reducing the extent of real earnings 
management is stronger for firms with higher board independence and for firms with 
higher institutional ownership, than for other firms. 
                                                            
11 The Rite Aid Corp fraud case is a good example illustrating this point. As discussed in Dyck et al. (2010), “Joseph 
Speaker, a senior finance executive at Rite Aid, informs the board of large accounting irregularities at Rite Aid. 
After firing the CFO, naming Speaker as CFO, and conducting an internal audit, the board admits to the firm’s 
overstating earnings by $1.1 billion, primarily in inventory overvaluation.” The board later also fired the CEO. Had 
the board not taken disciplinary action on the CEO, Joseph Speaker would not have succeeded. This example 
illustrates that having a strong board can enhance the effectiveness of internal governance.  
12 Acharya et al. (2011) do not specify the exact form of other governance mechanisms in their discussion. We 
extend their logic and argue that the effectiveness of internal governance increases with the common proxies for the 
strength of other governance mechanisms, which prior research shows improves shareholders’ ability to monitor and 
discipline the CEO (e.g., firing the CEO). While the monitoring by the board of directors and institutional investors 
is probably the most commonly examined dimensions of corporate governance, there are other dimensions of 
corporate governance. Examining all possible dimensions of corporate governance is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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It is possible that internal governance and other governance mechanisms work as 
substitutes. For example, a firm with an effective board will have a lower extent of myopic 
behavior due to the strong monitoring by the board. If so, the marginal impact of internal 
governance will be lower. Thus, whether we can find results consistent with H3 is an empirical 
question.  
 
3 Research Design 
3.1 Sample 
We obtain our initial sample of firms from Compustat ExecuComp in the period from 1993 
to 2011. We limit our examination to firms with compensation details of the top five executives 
and require at least five executives (including the CEO) to be reported in the annual proxy 
statement.13 To ensure that we have an appropriate measure of CEO’s influence within the firm, 
we require the CEO to be in office for the entire year. We exclude firms in financial industries 
(2-digit SICs between 60 and 69) and utility companies (2-digit SICs of 49) because firms in 
regulated industries have different financial reporting incentives from other firms. We then 
merge the sample of executive-level data with Compustat, CRSP and I/B/E/S to obtain the data 
for the other variables required for the analyses and we drop the observations that have missing 
values for these variables.  
To increase our ability to detect real earnings management, we focus on firm-years where 
CEOs have the greatest incentives to engage in earnings management – when firms meet or just 
beat an important earnings benchmark (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge et al. 
                                                            
13 About 9% of firm-year observations in ExecuComp report compensation information for fewer than five 
executives. Following Bebchuk et al. (2011), we exclude these observations from our sample to ensure that our 
measure of key subordinate executives’ influence is comparable across firms. 
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1999). For this purpose, we follow prior research (e.g., Roychowdhury 2006) and limit our 
sample to firm-years with earnings surprise between zero and one percent of share price, where 
earnings surprise is defined as actual earnings minus the most recent consensus analyst forecast 
before the earnings announcement. We obtain quantitatively similar results if we use alternative 
cutoff points for earnings surprises, such as 0.5 percent of share price. Our final sample consists 
of 8,061 firm-years. Panel A of Table 1 reports the sample selection process. 
Table 1, Panel B reports the job titles of the key subordinate executives in our sample 
firms.14 In our empirical tests, key subordinate executives refer to the top executives included in 
the ExecuComp database other than the CEO. We limit our scope of subordinate executives to 
the top four executives other than the CEO because most firms only disclose the compensation 
details of the top five executives (including the CEO) in their proxy statements. The CFO is 
usually included in the top four executives, with an increased frequency in recent years, possibly 
because of the increasing influence of CFOs in the post Sarbanes-Oxley era. Other key 
executives reported in the proxy statements usually hold job titles such as Chief Operating 
Officer (COO), President, Executive or Senior Vice President, and Vice President. These titles 
suggest that the key subordinate executives in our sample usually hold very important positions 
and thus have significant responsibilities within the firm, leading to their ability to monitor the 
CEO and to influence real earnings management. 
3.2 Measure of Internal Governance 
In this paper, we posit that the effectiveness of internal governance increases with key 
subordinate executives’ incentives and ability to monitor the CEO. We measure key subordinate 
                                                            
14 Ideally, we would like to categorize the job title of the key subordinate executives based on their job function, 
such as sales, production, R&D. However, the job titles in ExecuComp do not indicate the job scope of the key 
executives, and many firms categorize their job titles by business segments (e.g. subsidiaries), geographical 
segments or product segments rather than by function. As such, we can only provide generic job titles. 
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executives’ monitoring incentives based on their decision horizon, which we proxy for using the 
number of years until the age of retirement (assumed to be 65):15,16  
Exec_Horizon = 65 – the average age of key subordinate executives 
Next, we measure key subordinate executives’ ability to monitor the CEO based on their 
influence within the organization. We posit that competitive labor markets dictate the 
compensation of top executives and hence their compensation reflects their contribution to, and 
their influence within, the firm.17 In addition, Finkelstein (1992) argues that an executive’s 
compensation reflects her power derived from her structural position in the firm. Therefore, our 
measure of key subordinate executives’ ability to monitor the CEO is defined as follows:18 
Exec_PayRatio = Average annual compensation of key subordinate executives ÷ CEO’s 
annual compensation 
We scale the average compensation of key subordinate executives by the annual 
compensation of the CEO because the hypothesis development implies that we should use a 
measure of key subordinate executives’ influence within the firm. The level of key executives’ 
compensation varies across firms and does not capture how much influence the executives have 
within the firm. For example, subordinate executives in an S&P500 large cap company might 
                                                            
15 We use the horizon of the key subordinate executives, not their horizon relative to the CEO’s, because it is the 
horizon itself that leads subordinate executives to care about long-term firm value. The difference in horizon does 
not necessarily capture executives’ incentives to increase long-term firm value. For example, in company A, 
subordinate executives are on average 50 years old and the CEO is 55 years old; in company B, subordinate 
executives are on average 60 years old and the CEO is 65 years old. While the difference in horizon between 
subordinate executives and the CEO is the same for the two companies, company A’s subordinate executives have 
longer horizon, arguably care more about the firm’s long-term value, than their counterparts in Company B. In the 
empirical analyses, we include CEO horizon to control for its impact on the extent of real earnings management. 
Nevertheless, we obtain qualitatively similar results when using the difference in horizon.  
16 Assuming a different retirement age, such as 70, does not change the regression results (except the intercept) 
because the retirement age is assumed to be a cross-sectional constant and is thus just a scalar. 
17 Executives’ compensation is also closely related to their outside opportunity wage, which is then related to their 
influence within the firm. An executive with a higher outside opportunity wage is more likely to stand by his or her 
position and is less concerned with the CEO’s reaction (e.g., being demoted or fired).  
18 Some prior studies use variations of the inverse of this measure, or pay slice, to capture tournament incentives 
(Kale et al. 2009) or CEO dominance (Bebchuk et al. 2011; Feng et al. 2011).   
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erroneously be regarded as having more influence than their counterparts in an S&P600 small 
cap company if one uses the unscaled level of compensation as the proxy for their influence 
within the firm. Hence, it is imperative that we define the subordinate executives’ ability to 
influence the CEO using their relative compensation to the CEO’s.  
Finally, we derive an aggregate measure of a firm’s overall internal governance 
effectiveness based on both the incentives and ability of key subordinate executives to monitor 
the CEO. In particular, we standardize both Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio and sum these 
two standardized measures as our proxy for the firm’s overall internal governance effectiveness 
(Int_Governance).19 We also explore an alternative aggregate measure based on a non-linear 
combination of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio and obtain quantitatively similar results 
(untabulated).20 Note that Int_Governance is not a common factor of Exec_Horizon and 
Exec_PayRatio. We are not assuming these two variables are highly correlated and capture the 
same underlying construct. Instead, we argue that these two variables capture different 
dimensions of internal governance; executives with long horizon and high pay relative to the 
CEO (a high value of Int_Governance) have both the incentive and the ability to monitor CEOs 
than their counterparts with short horizon and low pay relative to the CEO (a low value of 
Int_Governance). 
3.3 Measure of Real Earnings Management 
We derive our measure of real earnings management following prior studies 
(Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen and Zarowin 2010). In particular, we use three individual metrics, 
abnormal levels of cash flows from operations (RM_CFO), production costs (RM_PROD) and 
                                                            
19 Specifically, for each of the two variables, we deduct the sample mean and then divide the difference by the 
sample standard deviation of the variable.  
20 In particular, we form tercile ranks on Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio, sum the tercile rank of both variables, 
and then rescale the aggregate measure to lie within zero and one. 
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discretionary expenses (RM_DISX), and two aggregate metrics (RM1 and RM2) to measure the 
level of real earnings management.  To estimate the normal levels of real activities, we estimate 
the following models by industry (at the 2-digit SIC level) and year and require at least ten 
observations for each industry-year combination, using firms from the Compustat universe: 
Cash flows from operations (CFO) model: 
ܥܨ ௜ܱ௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ିଵ ൌ ߙଵ
1
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଶ
ܵܣܮܧ ௜ܵ௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଷ
Δܵܣܮܧ ௜ܵ௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
Production Costs (PROD) model:21 
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Discretionary Expenses (DISX) model: 
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We then use the residuals from the above estimation models as the proxies for real earnings 
management. Executives can artificially inflate reported earnings by: 1) accelerating sales using 
aggressive price discounts and/or more lenient credit terms which results in abnormally low 
CFO; 2) reducing the costs of sales by increasing production so as to spread the fixed costs of 
production over a larger number of units, thereby resulting in abnormally high PROD; 3) 
reducing the amount of discretionary research and development (R&D), advertising, and selling, 
general and administrative (SG&A) expenses which result in abnormally low DISX. Therefore, 
higher abnormal PROD, lower abnormal CFO, and lower abnormal DISX are consistent with 
earnings-increasing real earnings management. For ease of interpretation, all real earnings 
management measures (RM_CFO, RM_PROD, and RM_DISX) are defined to be increasing in 
reported earnings; that is, we use the negative of the residuals from the CFO and DISX models to 
                                                            
21 PROD is defined as the sum of the cost of goods sold (COGS) and the change in inventory (ΔINVT). 
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define RM_CFO and RM_DISX. 
Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010), we define two aggregate measures of real earnings 
management, RM1 and RM2, as follows, to capture the total amount of real earnings 
management engaged by the firm in a particular fiscal year:22 
RM1 = RM_DISX +RM_ PROD 
RM2 = RM_CFO + RM_DISX 
3.4 Empirical Model 
Below we describe the research design for the main test of H1. The design for other tests is 
described in the corresponding empirical analysis sections. To test H1, we estimate the following 
regression: 
ti,
ti,1-ti,1-ti,ti,
 + Year_FE +  EIndustry_F +
 olsFirm_Contr + lsCEO_Contro + anceInt_Govern +  =RM

 ψγ  (1) 
where RMi,t is the measure of real earnings management and Int_Governancei,t-1 is the measure 
of a firm’s internal governance strength, as discussed above. Hypothesis H1 predicts a negative 
coefficient on Int_Governance. CEO_Controlsi,t-1 are CEO characteristics included to control for 
the CEO’s incentives and power in the prior fiscal year; Firm_Controlsi,t are contemporaneous 
firm-level control variables; Industry_FE and Year_FE are industry and year fixed-effects, 
respectively.23 We used the lagged value of all variables relating to internal governance and 
CEO’s characteristics to alleviate potential endogeneity issues. We also utilize an instrumental 
variable approach to further mitigate this concern, as discussed in Section 5.2. Appendix A 
                                                            
22 We do not use an aggregate measure based on all three real earnings management proxies because, as suggested in 
Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), some activities that lead to abnormally high production costs 
might also lead to abnormally low CFO. Therefore, combining these two measures can result in double counting. 
Further, we note that the three individual measures capture different types of real earnings management. As a result, 
we do not use a common factor based on these three measures in the analyses. Instead, as in prior studies (e.g. 
Cohen and Zarowin 2010), we use the aggregate measure to capture the total amount of real earnings management. 
23 Because of the inclusion of industry and year fixed effects, the intercept (α) captures the extent of real earnings 
management for firms in the industry and year that do not have corresponding indicators in the regression and when 
all independent variables have values of zero. As such, we do not present the estimates of the intercept in the tables. 
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includes the detailed definition of all variables. To mitigate the influence of extreme values, all 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Because we use a pooled sample, 
we use firm and year clustered standard errors to control for cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence in the data (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010).  
We include CEO control variables to mitigate the concern that our proxies for key 
subordinate executives’ incentives and ability to monitor the CEO merely capture the effect of 
CEO’s incentives and power on real earnings management. Specifically, we include the CEO’s 
decision horizon (CEO_Horizon), proxied by the number of years until the age of retirement 
(assumed to be 65), the CEO’s annual compensation (CEO_Comp), and the normalized CEO’s 
pay-for-performance sensitivity (CEO_PPS), measured as the sensitivity of the CEO’s equity 
portfolio to the firm’s stock performance (Core and Guay 2002). 
Following prior studies, we include several firm-level control variables to capture the 
impact of firm characteristics on the extent of real earnings management. The inclusion of these 
variables can also help address omitted correlated variable concern arising from potential 
endogeneity of internal governance. Firm age (Firm_Age) is included because younger firms, 
which are usually high-growth firms and are expected to obtain additional financing in the 
future, likely face greater capital markets pressure to deliver and hence are more likely to engage 
in real earnings management to meet earnings targets (Skinner and Sloan 2002; Erickson et al. 
2006; Armstrong et al. 2012). We include the number of analysts following (N_Analyst) as a 
control because monitoring by financial analysts is likely to constrain real earnings management 
(Cohen and Zarowin 2010). Firm performance (ROA), firm size (Size), the book-to-market ratio 
(B/M), and leverage (Leverage) are included as controls for other firm-specific characteristics 
such as capital structure and growth opportunities that likely affect real earnings management 
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(Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen and Zarowin 2010).24  
Lastly, because we focus on suspect firms, we include an inverse-mills ratio (IMR) to 
control for the potential sample selection bias.25 For this purpose, we estimate a probit model of 
an indicator variable for suspect firm-year observations on various explanatory variables (e.g. 
Cohen and Zarowin 2010): an indicator for habitual beaters, future equity issuance, analysts 
following, firm growth, shares outstanding, and firm performance. From this estimation model, 
we obtain the IMR and include it in all our regression models. 
3.5 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1, Panel C reports descriptive statistics on the regression variables. Because the 
model for real earnings management is estimated using the Compustat universe, the means of the 
individual real earning management proxies are not zero. The statistics on real earnings 
management proxies are similar to those reported in prior research (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008). The 
mean (median) decision horizon of key subordinate executives (Exec_Horizon) is 12.57 (13.00) 
years, which is longer than that of the CEO’s mean (median) decision horizon (CEO_Horizon) of 
9.46 (9.00) years by 32.9% (44.4%). This comparison supports the notion that key subordinate 
executives have longer decision horizons and have incentives to monitor the CEO. The mean 
(median) annual compensation of the key subordinate executive relative to the CEO’s annual 
compensation is 0.548 (0.429), i.e., 54.8% (42.9%) of the CEO’s annual compensation. By 
construction, the summary measure of internal governance, Int_Governance, has a mean of zero. 
                                                            
24 We also control for other variables that might affect the extent of real earnings management, such as the G-index, 
an indicator for CEO-Chairman duality, the pay for performance sensitivity of key subordinate executives, and the 
squared term of internal governance measures. The untabulated analyses indicate that the results on the variables of 
interest are qualitatively similar. The G-index and the CEO-Chairman duality exhibit significantly positive 
coefficients in some specifications, consistent with the extent of real earnings management being higher when there 
are more anti-takeover measures and when the CEO is more likely to be entrenched. The other aforementioned 
variables are insignificant in most specifications. We omit these controls in our main analyses in favor of a more 
parsimonious empirical model.   
25 That is, we use Heckman’s (1979) two-stage approach to address the concern that our sample is not a random 
sample in terms of the propensity to just meet or beat earnings expectations. 
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As our sample firms are from ExecuComp which only includes firms from the S&P1500, our 
sample firms are significantly more mature (mean Firm_Age of 23.4 years), have more analysts 
following (mean N_Analyst of 11.9 analysts), are better performing (mean ROA of 7.5%), and 
are larger (mean Size of 7.5) as compared to the firms covered in the Compustat universe in the 
same time period (results untabulated).26 The average book-to-market ratio is 0.44 and the 
average leverage is 0.50.  
Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation table of the variables in our main analysis. The 
three measures of real earnings management (RM_CFO, RM_PROD and RM_DISX) are highly 
positively correlated with each other except for the correlation between RM_CFO and 
RM_DISX. These high correlations suggest that firms manage various real activities in tandem 
with other real activities. By construction, RM1 and RM2 are highly correlated with individual 
components and with each other. The correlation between Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio is 
positive, but the relatively low correlation coefficient (0.07) suggests that key subordinate 
executives’ decision horizon and influence capture different aspects of firms’ internal 
governance. Consistent with H1, almost all real earnings management measures are negatively 
associated with the proxies of internal governance. None of the correlations between control 
variables are high enough to impose a multicollinearity problem. 
 
4 Results 
4.1 Main Analyses – Tests of H1 
In this section, we report our main tests of H1. We first analyze the separate impact of 
executive horizon and pay ratio on the extent of real earnings management, and then the impact 
                                                            
26 For comparison purposes, the average firm in the Compustat universe in the same period is 13.1 years old, is 
followed by 4.4 analysts, has an ROA of -0.8% and Size of 5.8.  
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of the combined internal governance measure. Table 3 presents the results. For ease of 
exposition, all measures of real earnings management are multiplied by 100. 
Table 3, Panel A presents the separate impact of subordinate executives’ decision horizon 
and pay ratio on real earnings management. We find that as predicted in H1, both executives’ 
decision horizon and influence are significantly negatively associated with the extent of real 
earnings management, whether proxied by the three individual measures (with the exception of 
the association between Exec_PayRatio and RM_CFO) or by the two summary measures.  
The results on control variables are generally consistent with prior studies. We find some 
evidence that firms with CEOs that have longer horizon are less likely to engage in real earnings 
management. CEOs with higher compensation (which also signifies their ability in the 
competitive labor market) are less likely to engage in real earnings management, which suggests 
better-ability CEOs are associated with better earnings quality (Demerjian et al. 2013). We also 
find that firms with more analysts following and better performance are less likely to engage in 
real earnings management and firms with higher book-to-market and leverage are more likely to 
engage in real earnings management. There is also some evidence that large firms and younger 
firms are more likely to engage in real earnings management. Finally, the inverse-mills ratio 
(IMR) is significant in most specifications, although the results on the variable of interest remain 
the same when we do not include IMR. 
Table 3 Panel B reports the analysis of the impact of the overall internal governance on real 
earnings management. Consistent with the results reported above, the overall internal governance 
(Int_Governance) is significantly associated with a lower extent of real earnings management, 
after controlling for CEO and firm characteristics. The effect of internal governance on real 
earnings management is also economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in 
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Int_Governance is associated with a decrease in RM1 and RM2 of 2.9% and 2.1% of total assets, 
respectively.27  
We conduct a series of additional analyses to ensure the robustness of the results and we do 
not tabulate the results to save space. First, we examine whether our results are driven by CFOs’ 
incentives and ability to monitor the CEO. For this purpose, we exclude CFOs from our 
measurement of internal governance. The untabulated results are quantitatively similar, 
suggesting that other key subordinate executives do influence real earnings management. 
Second, in the main analyses, we use the average of executive horizon and relative compensation 
to construct internal governance measures. We find similar results (1) when we use the median 
of key executives’ decision horizon and pay ratio in order to mitigate the concern that our results 
are driven by extreme values in the internal governance variables, and (2) when we use the 
maximum value of key executives’ decision horizon and pay ratio (internal governance can 
arguably be exerted by the executive who has the greatest incentive and ability to monitor the 
CEO).  
Overall, the results reported above are consistent with H1 that the extent of real earnings 
management is negatively associated with the effectiveness of internal governance.  
4.2 Cross-sectional Analyses 
4.2.1 Research Design  
To test H2 and H3, we estimate the following regression: 
ti,ti,
1-ti,ti,1-ti,
ti,1-ti,ti,
 + Year_FE +  EIndustry_F + olsFirm_Contr +
 lsCEO_Contro +l_VARConditionaanceInt_Govern +
  l_VARConditiona anceInt_Govern +  =RM



ψ
γ

 (2) 
                                                            
27 The impact on RM1 expressed as a percentage of total assets is computed as -2.014 (the coefficient on 
Int_Governance) × 1.464 (the sample standard deviation of Int_Governance). Note that all measures of real earnings 
management are already multiplied by 100 and hence presented as a percentage of total assets. The impact on RM2 
is computed analogously. 
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where Conditional_VARi,t is a conditioning variable that moderates the association between a 
firm’s internal governance effectiveness and real earnings management. For sake of space, we 
focus on the two aggregate measures of real earnings management (RM1 and RM2) and the 
aggregate measure of the firm’s internal governance (Int_Governance). All other variables are 
defined as above. The estimation of regression (2) is similar to that of regression (1). To test H2 
(H3), Conditional_VARi,t refers to proxies for key subordinate executives’ contribution to the 
firm’s performance (proxies for the strength of other governance mechanisms). We explain the 
proxies below.  
4.2.2 The Conditioning Effect of Firm Complexity – Test of H2 
To test H2, we examine whether the relationship between the effectiveness of internal 
governance and real earnings management is stronger in firms where key subordinate executives’ 
contribution to the firm’s performance is expected to be higher. We expect key subordinate 
executives’ contribution to the firm’s performance to be more important when the firm operates 
in an R&D intensive industry where technological complexity is high and when the complexity 
surrounding operating in diverse geographical locations is high (e.g., Finkelstein 1992; Graham 
et al. 2013). We proxy for operation complexity using the following two measures: (1) an 
indicator (IND_RD) that equals one (zero) for firm-year observations in the top (bottom) tercile 
of industry R&D intensity; and (2) an indicator (GEO_Complexy) that equals one (zero) for firm-
year observations in the top (bottom) tercile of the first principle component of the following 
three variables: the number of geographical segments, geographical sales concentration and the 
percentage of foreign sales.28 (To increase the power of the test, we exclude firm-years in the 
middle tercile.) To test H2, we replace Conditional_VARi,t in equation (2) with each of the two 
                                                            
28 We do not combine IND_RD and GEO_Complexy into one common factor because unreported factor analysis 
results in two principle components each with an eigenvalue greater than one, suggesting that these two measures 
appear to capture different constructs. 
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measures and we expect a negative coefficient on the interaction term. 
Table 4 reports the regression results. We find the negative impact of internal governance 
on the extent of real earnings management is significantly stronger in industries with higher 
R&D intensity (Panel A, t-statistic = -2.86 and -2.93, respectively). The impact of internal 
governance is also stronger in firms with more diverse geographical operations, although only 
marginally significant in the case of RM2 (Panel B, t-statistic = -0.98 and -1.28, respectively). 
Overall, the results in Table 4 are consistent with hypothesis H2 that the impact of internal 
governance is stronger in more complex firms where key subordinate executives are expected to 
play a greater role in the firm’s operations. 
4.2.3 The Conditioning Effect of Other Governance Mechanisms – Test of H3 
In H3, we predict that other governance mechanisms strengthen the effectiveness of 
internal governance. To represent the strength of other governance mechanisms, we recognize 
that there are a number of governance measures which are highly correlated with each other and 
that it is an empirical challenge to find one single measure that represents the overall governance 
(Larcker et al. 2008). Hence, we rely on extant literature and utilize two commonly used proxies 
for the other corporate governance mechanisms: board independence and institutional ownership. 
Prior literature finds that independent directors and institutional investors exert significant 
discipline over poor-performing CEOs (e.g., Weisbach 1988; Parrino et al. 2003). We construct 
an indicator (CORP_GOV) that equals one (zero) if a firm-year observation is in the top (bottom) 
tercile of the first principal component of the two variables: the percentage of independent 
directors and institutional ownership.29 To test H3, we replace Conditional_VARi,t with this 
                                                            
29 We also conduct additional analyses by redefining institutional ownership to only include the ownership of 
independent and long-term institutions that specialize in monitoring, as argued in Chen et al. (2007) and we find 
qualitatively similar results. Independent and long-term institutions include those who are: 1) either investment 
companies, independent investment advisors or pension funds; 2) the top 5 institutional owners in the current and 
30 
 
measure of corporate governance and we expect a negative coefficient on the interaction term. 
Table 5 presents the regression results. We find that the negative impact of internal 
governance on real earnings management is significantly stronger for firms that have stronger 
governance mechanisms (t-statistic = -1.86 and -1.94, respectively). These results are consistent 
with hypothesis H3 that effective board oversight and higher institutional ownership can enhance 
key subordinate executives’ ability to monitor the CEO. It is interesting to note that 
Int_Governance becomes statistically insignificant, suggesting that internal governance requires 
the presence of other governance mechanisms to function effectively. Also note that the other 
governance mechanisms (CORP_GOV) have a negative impact on real earnings management (t-
statistic = -3.02 and -3.14 respectively). Overall, these results are consistent with hypothesis H3 
that internal governance and other governance mechanisms are complements in constraining real 
earnings management.  
 
5 Additional Analyses and Sensitivity Checks 
5.1 Internal Governance and Accrual-based Earnings Management  
In this paper, we find that internal governance is associated with lower extent of real 
earnings management. A natural extension is to examine whether internal governance is 
associated with accrual-based earnings management. The relationship between internal 
governance and accrual-based earnings management is less straightforward. On one hand, key 
subordinate executives (other than the CFO) are less likely to have a direct influence over the 
financial reporting process and accruals management.30 Hence, we would not expect a significant 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
prior fiscal year; and 3) dedicated or quasi-indexers according to Bushee (1998) classification. We thank Brian 
Bushee for sharing his data on institutional classification with us. 
30 In a similar vein, we do not study whether key subordinate executives play a role in other types of activities, such 
as expectation management (e.g., walking down analysts’ expectations) and re-classification of certain items in the 
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relation between internal governance and accrual-based earnings management. On the other 
hand, key executives are likely to have an important influence over the corporate culture and the 
overall corporate attitude toward earnings management. Key executives’ focus on the long-term 
value of the firm and their control over operational activities may in turn manifest in better 
financial reporting quality and less accrual-based earnings management. Thus, whether internal 
governance has an impact on the extent of accrual-based earnings management is an empirical 
question. This investigation is also important because of the potential interaction between accrual 
and real earnings management. As discussed in detail later, firms might jointly determine the 
extent of these two types of earnings management – the extent of one type of earnings 
management might affect the use of the other type.  
To test this potential effect, we measure accrual-based earnings management using the 
Modified Jones model (ACCEM) and replace REM with ACCEM as the dependent variable in 
equation (1).  Panel A of Table 6 reports the results. As reported in Column (1) of Panel A, we 
find that the extent of internal governance is associated with lower extent of accrual-based 
earnings management (t-statistic = -2.22). This finding is consistent with the idea that strong 
internal governance has a positive spillover effect on the overall corporate culture that restrains 
short-termism and hence results in lower accrual-based earnings management.  
Prior studies (e.g. Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Zang 2012) suggest that executives could use 
both real and accruals-based earnings management strategies to meet earnings targets. Both real 
and accrual earnings management are costly, although the costs manifest in different forms. Real 
earnings management has direct adverse consequences on future performance, but accrual 
earnings management is costly because it might lead to litigation and reputation risk if it is 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
financial statements. Generally, the CEO and/or the CFO, play a critical role in these activities and other key 
subordinate executives have little direct influence over such activities. 
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discovered to be noncompliant with GAAP. Compared to real earnings management, accrual 
earnings management is under greater scrutiny by auditors and regulators. In contrast, real 
operating activities are under managers’ discretion and thus real earnings management is harder 
for outsiders, including outside directors, to unravel. As such, recent studies argue and show that 
managers increasingly rely more on real earnings management than on accrual-based earnings 
management (Graham et al. 2005; Cohen et al. 2008). Zang (2012) further suggests that real 
earnings management usually occurs before accrual earnings management. To test the robustness 
of the results in Column (1), in columns (2) and (3), we control for RM1 and RM2 in the 
regressions. As reported, both RM1 and RM2 are significantly positively associated with ACCEM 
(t-statistic = 8.57 and 13.08 respectively), which suggests that real and accrual-based earning 
management are used in tandem with one another.31 Interestingly, Int_Governance is no longer 
significant after controlling for the extent of real earnings management (t-statistic = -1.36 and -
0.29 respectively). 
To ensure that our results on real earnings management are not affected by accrual-based 
earnings management, we add ACCEM to our main analyses of real earnings management and 
report the results in Panel B of Table 6. We find that Int_Governance is still negative and 
significant (t-statistic = -3.77 and -4.34, respectively) after controlling for ACCEM. Overall, the 
results suggest that key executives exert more significant influence over real, rather than accrual-
based, earnings management. 
5.2 An Instrumental Variable Approach to Address Endogeneity Concerns 
We recognize that our analyses might be subject to endogeneity concerns because firms’ 
                                                            
31 In untabulated analyses, we use a simultaneous equations approach to estimate the relation. Specially, we 
simultaneously estimate the two models, one for accrual-based earnings management and one for real earnings 
management, with both dependent variables as endogenous variables and including one as an independent when 
explaining the other. The inferences are the same: the coefficient on real earnings management proxy is positive 
when explaining accrual-based earnings management, and vice versa. 
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internal governance is arguably endogenously determined. As highlighted earlier, we mitigate 
this concern by using the lagged values of internal governance and including variables that are 
likely related to both internal governance and the extent of real earnings management (to address 
the omitted correlated variable problem). In addition, our cross-sectional analyses also mitigate 
this concern because it is arguably harder for an omitted variable to explain both our main and 
cross-sectional findings. Furthermore, in the later falsification test (Section 5.5) we do not find 
an impact of internal governance in subsamples where we do not expect to find one. In this 
section, we employ an instrumental variable approach to further address endogeneity concerns. 
Following related studies (e.g., Kale et al. 2009; Bebchuk et al. 2011), we utilize two 
instruments: 1) an indicator that equals one if the current CEO is recruited from outside, and zero 
otherwise (Outside_CEO); 2) the number of named executives in the annual proxy statement 
besides the CEO (Named_Exec). When the CEO is recruited from outside, the CEO is less likely 
to possess as much firm-specific knowledge as compared to an inside-CEO and hence the 
influence of other executives is likely higher, improving the effectiveness of internal governance. 
In a similar vein, a higher the number of named executives in the annual proxy statement implies 
a greater number of highly-paid executives and a stronger presence of divisional managers who 
can arguably increase the effectiveness of internal governance. However, we do not think that 
whether the CEO is recruited from inside or outside or the number of divisional managers is 
associated with the incentive to manipulate earnings through real earnings management. 
We report the first stage regression results in Column (1) of Table 7, where we regress 
Int_Governance on the two instruments as well as the controls used in the second stage 
regression. As predicted, we find that both Outside_CEO and Named_Exec are significantly 
positively associated with Int_Governance (t-statistic = 5.03 and 3.48, respectively). The weak 
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identification test suggests that these two instruments are powerful: the F statistic for the joint 
explanatory power of the instrument variables is 16.65, significantly higher than the critical 
value suggested in Stock et al. (2002).32 This diagnostic test provides some assurance that our 
two instruments are jointly relevant.    
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 7 report the second stage regression results. We find that the 
predicted internal governance estimated from the first-stage regression is significantly negatively 
associated with RM1 and RM2 (t-statistic = -3.47 and -3.56, respectively). The result from the 
over-identification test of all instruments is insignificant (J-statistic = 0.002 and 0.005, 
respectively), suggesting that the instruments are valid (i.e. uncorrelated with the error term in 
the second stage). Overall, the results from the instrumental variable approach indicate that our 
results still hold after controlling for potential endogeneity concern. 
5.3 An Alternative Measure of Key Subordinate Executives’ Power 
Throughout the paper, we use a compensation-related measure to capture key executives’ 
influence within the firm. In this subsection, we explore an alternative measure of key 
subordinate executives’ influence that is based on the number of directorships in other firms held 
by these executives (Other_Director). Finkelstein (1992) argue that sitting on other firms’ boards 
reflects an executive’s power. Masulis and Mobbs (2011) also argue that these executives are 
more influential and are more likely to serve as the CEO in the future, and consistent with this 
notion, they find that firms with executives who serve on other companies’ boards are associated 
with lower manager-shareholder agency costs. Accordingly, we expect that key subordinate 
executives who have directorships in other firms to exert greater influence over the current CEO 
and that the more directorships they have, the stronger their influence. To test this prediction, we 
                                                            
32 We use the ivreg2 module in Stata 12 written by Baum et al. (2010) to conduct our instrumental variables 
analyses. 
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include this alternative measure of key executives’ power in our regression and report the results 
in Table 8. In our sample, 8.9% of firm-year observations have at least one key executive who 
holds directorship(s) in other firms.33  
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 8, we use Other_Director in place of Exec_PayRatio as an 
alternative proxy for key subordinate executives’ influence.  As predicted, we find that 
Other_Director is negatively associated with RM1 and RM2, significant at the 0.01 level in both 
models (t-statistic = -2.61 and -2.32, respectively). This result suggests that key subordinate 
executives with outside directorships exert greater influence in constraining real earnings 
management. In columns (3) and (4), we explore whether Other_Director captures a different 
dimension of executives’ influence as compared to Exec_PayRatio by including both variables in 
the same regression. We find that both variables have significantly negative coefficients, 
suggesting that Other_Director represents a different aspect of executives’ influence within the 
firm. The results on other variables, including executive horizon, are similar to those reported 
above.  
5.4 The Effectiveness of Internal Governance: Pre- versus Post-SOX Period 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereafter, “SOX”), passed on July 30, 2002, aims at 
strengthening corporate governance and mitigating managerial incentives to manipulate earnings 
via accruals. Prior research (e.g. Graham et al. 2005; Cohen et al. 2008) finds that the passage of 
SOX and the increased regulatory scrutiny on accrual-based earnings management led many 
firms to switch to real earnings management. When CEOs switch to value-decreasing real 
activities manipulations, we expect key subordinate executives to exert more influence over real 
                                                            
33 Within the group of firms with key subordinate executives serving as directors in other firms, 63% of the firms 
have one key subordinate executive serving as directors in other firms, 25% have two key subordinate executives 
serving as directors in other firms, and 12% have three or more key subordinate executives serving as directors in 
other firms. 
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earnings management in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period. In addition, the 
passage of SOX increases the overall emphasis on corporate governance and hence, key 
subordinate executives are likely to obtain greater support from other governance mechanisms, 
such as the board of directors, in the monitoring of the CEO, also leading to more effective 
internal governance. To test this prediction, we create an indicator variable (Post_SOX) that 
equals one if the fiscal year is 2002 or later, and zero otherwise, and replace Conditional_VAR in 
equation (2) with Post_SOX.34 Because of the inclusion of the Post_SOX variable, we cannot 
include year fixed-effects; instead we include a time trend variable (Time). The results are 
presented in Table 9. Consistent with our predictions, the coefficient on the interaction term is 
significantly negative (t-statistic = -3.09 and -2.88, respectively), implying that the effectiveness 
of internal governance in constraining real earnings management is strengthened in the post-SOX 
period.  
5.5 Falsification Test 
For the empirical tests in this study, we restrict our sample to observations that meet or just 
beat earnings expectations because this is the sample where CEOs have heightened incentives to 
engage in earnings management (Roychowdhury 2006). As a falsification test, we re-run our 
main analyses on a sample where we do not expect earnings management and hence internal 
governance is less likely to matter. Specifically, we construct a sample of firm-years with 
earnings surprises less than -0.5% of stock price (big miss) and larger than 1% of stock price (big 
beat). We exclude the sample of firm-years with earnings surprises between -0.5% and 0% of 
stock price for two reasons. First, given the potential stock price penalty associated with missing 
analyst forecast, it is possible that managers engaged in earnings management but failed to meet 
                                                            
34 The results are quantitatively similar if we drop 2002 and 2003 from the post-SOX period as these two years 
might be regarded as a transition period when many sections of SOX were not yet fully effective.  
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the benchmark. Second, managers near the important earnings benchmark may still manage 
earnings upwards to meet other internal and unobservable targets (Roychowdhury 2006; Zang 
2012). Table 10 presents the results of this falsification test.  
As expected, Int_Governance is not significantly associated with the extent of real 
earnings management at conventional levels in this subsample of firm-years where the incentive 
to manage earnings upward is expected to be low.35 This result reinforces our inference that 
internal governance plays a more important role in constraining real earnings management when 
the incentives to meet or beat earnings target is high. 
 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine whether key subordinate executives have the incentives and 
ability to restrain the extent of real earnings management. Compared to the CEO, key 
subordinate executives are usually younger, have longer horizon, and care more about future 
performance. Also, key subordinate executives have the ability to influence CEOs’ decisions 
because of their significant involvement in the firm’s operations as well as their contribution to 
the firm’s current performance, which are important to the CEO. Using the number of years to 
retirement to capture key subordinate executives’ incentives and their compensation relative to 
the CEO’s to capture their influence within the firm, we find that the extent of real earnings 
management decreases with key subordinate executives’ horizon and influence.  
We then examine whether the impact of internal governance varies with proxies for key 
subordinate executives’ contribution and the strength of other governance mechanisms. We find 
                                                            
35 One potential reason why we fail to find statistical significance in these falsification tests is the lack of test power 
because we conduct these analyses on a smaller subsample. We do not think that test power is a significant concern 
because we still find statistical significance in many of the control variables, and the adjusted R2 is relatively similar 
to the main analyses, which suggest that there is sufficient test power in these empirical tests. 
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that the impact of internal governance is stronger in more complex firms where key subordinate 
executives play a more important role and in firms with stronger other governance mechanisms. 
We conduct a series of additional tests to ensure the robustness of our results and to provide 
additional insights. First, our inferences remain the same after we control for the potential 
endogeneity concerns using an instrumental variable approach. Second, we use an alternative 
measure of key subordinate executives’ ability to influence corporate decisions: whether the 
subordinate executives sit on other companies’ boards, and the inference remains the same. 
Third, we find that our results are stronger in the post-SOX period when real earnings 
management is likely more prevalent than in the pre-SOX period. Lastly, in a falsification test, 
we find that internal governance is not correlated with the extent of real earnings management in 
a sample where we expect not to find results, further strengthening our main inference. 
We contribute to the literature by examining the impact of internal governance on the 
extent of real earnings management. This examination is important because it sheds light on how 
the members of the management team work together and shape financial reporting. Unlike prior 
research which generally views executives as a unified team, this paper provides evidence that 
subordinate executives can provide an important monitoring role on the CEOs from the bottom 
up and that effective internal governance can reduce the extent of real earnings management. 
This paper differs from and complements studies on the impact of CFO characteristics on accrual 
quality or the likelihood of earnings restatements/frauds by focusing on all subordinate 
executives and by focusing on real earnings management.  
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APPENDIX 
Variables Definition 
 
ACCEM Measure of discretionary accruals computed using the Modified Jones 
model. 
B/M The book to market ratio in the current fiscal year, defined as book value 
of equity (CEQ) divided by the market value of equity (CSHO*PRCC_F). 
CEO_Comp The CEO’s logged total compensation in the prior fiscal year. 
CEO_Horizon CEO’s decision horizon, defined as retirement age of 65 minus the age of 
the CEO. 
CEO_PPS The normalized pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of 
equity in the prior fiscal year, measured similarly to Core and Guay 
(2002). 
CORP_GOV An indicator equals one (zero) if the firm-year observation is in the top 
(bottom) tercile of the first principle component of the following two 
variables: 1) percentage of independent directors and; 2) institutional 
ownership. 
Exec_Horizon Subordinate executives’ decision horizon, defined as retirement age of 65 
minus the average age of other executives. 
Exec_PayRatio Subordinate executives’ ability to influence the CEO, defined as the 
average total compensation of other executives, scaled by the CEO’s total 
compensation, measured in the prior fiscal year. 
EQ_Issue An indicator equals one if the firm issues equity in the following fiscal 
year, and zero otherwise. 
Firm_Age The age of the firm, defined as the number of years since the firm’s stock 
returns is first reported in the monthly stock files of CRSP. 
GEO_Complexy An indicator equals one (zero) if the firm-year observation is in the top 
(bottom) tercile of the first principle component of the following three 
variables: 1) number of geographical segments; 2) geographical sales 
concentration and; 3) percentage of foreign sales. 
Hab_Beat The number of times that the firm has just meet or beat earnings 
expectations in the prior four quarters. 
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IMR The inverse mills ratio from the following probit regression: 
 ܲݎ݋ܾሾܷܵܵܲܧܥܶ ൌ 1ሿ ൌ ܲݎ݋ܾ݅ݐሺߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܪܾܽ_ܤ݁ܽݐ௧ ൅ ߚଶܧܳ_ܫݏݏݑ݁௧ାଵ ൅
ߚଷܰ_ܣ݈݊ܽݕݏݐ௧ ൅ ߚସܲܤ/ܯ௧ ൅ ߚହ݄ܵܽݎ݁ݏ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܴܱܣ௧ ൅ ߝ௧ሻ 
IND_RD An indicator equals one (zero) if the firm-year observation is in the top 
(bottom) tercile of industry research and development intensity. 
Int_Governance Firm’s overall internal governance, measured as the sum of the 
standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. 
Leverage The leverage ratio in the current fiscal year, defined as total liabilities (AT 
– CEQ) divided by total assets (AT). 
N_Analyst The number of analysts following the firm in the current fiscal year, 
obtained from I/B/E/S. 
Named_Exec The number of named executives in the annual proxy statement besides 
the CEO in the prior fiscal year. 
Other_Director The number of independent directorships in other firms held by key 
subordinate executives. 
Outside_CEO An indicator equals one if the current CEO is recruited from outside, and 
zero otherwise. 
PB/M The book to market ratio in the prior fiscal year, defined as book value of 
equity (CEQ) divided by the market value of equity (CSHO*PRCC_F). 
Post_SOX An indicator equals one if fiscal year is on or after 2002, and zero 
otherwise. 
RM_CFO A real earnings management proxy that negatively affects cash flows from 
operations. 
RM_DISX A real earnings management proxy that negatively affects discretionary 
expenses. 
RM_PROD A real earnings management proxy that negatively affects production. 
RM1 An aggregate measure of real earnings management, defined as the sum of 
RM_PROD and RM_DISX. 
RM2 An aggregate measure of real earnings management, defined as the sum of 
RM_CFO and RM_DISX. 
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ROA Return on assets in the current fiscal year, defined as earnings before 
extraordinary items (IB), scaled by beginning total assets (AT). 
Shares The logged number of shares outstanding in the current fiscal year. 
Size The logged value of total assets (AT) in the current fiscal year. 
SUSPECT An indicator equals one for firm-year observations with earnings surprise 
between zero and one percent of share price, and zero otherwise. 
Time A time trend variable which equals to the difference between the current 
fiscal year and 1992. 
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 TABLE 1 
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
Obs.
Total number of firm-year observations from 1993-2011 with Compustat, 
ExecuComp and I/B/E/S data 23,647 
Less: financials (2-digit SIC between 60 and 69) and utilities (2-digit SIC 
49) firms (5,133)
Less: missing values for variables used in the regressions (5,987)
Less: firm-year observations with earnings surprise outside the range of 
0% and 1% of stock price (4,466)
Final sample 8,061 
Number of unique firms 1,825 
Panel B: Titles of Key Subordinate Executives 
Title Obs.   %
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 6,415  19.90 
Chief Operating Officer (COO) 3,521  10.92 
President 4,818  14.94 
Executive Vice President 4,997  15.50 
Senior Vice President 4,838  15.00 
Vice President 4,199  13.02 
Others 3,456  10.72 
Total 32,244  100.00 
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TABLE 1(Cont’d) 
Panel C: Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3
RM_CFO 8,061 -0.060 -0.051 0.109 -0.116 0.004
RM_PROD 8,061 -0.036 -0.028 0.197 -0.140 0.072
RM_DISX 8,061 0.043 0.047 0.212 -0.059 0.160
RM1 8,061 0.008 0.023 0.375 -0.181 0.210
RM2 8,061 -0.017 -0.005 0.227 -0.133 0.108
Exec_Horizon 8,061 12.571 13.000 6.462 9.000 16.750
Exec_PayRatio 8,061 0.548 0.429 0.502 0.320 0.589
Int_Governance 8,061 0.000 -0.131 1.464 -0.777 0.583
CEO_Horizon 8,061 9.464 9.000 7.789 5.000 15.000
CEO_Comp 8,061 7.957 7.955 1.069 7.199 8.709
CEO_PPS 8,061 0.299 0.225 0.237 0.120 0.412
Firm_Age 8,061 23.360 17.000 19.233 9.000 32.000
N_Analyst 8,061 11.942 10.000 7.791 6.000 17.000
ROA 8,061 0.075 0.071 0.087 0.037 0.114
Size 8,061 7.483 7.334 1.494 6.382 8.437
B/M 8,061 0.444 0.389 0.295 0.247 0.579
Leverage 8,061 0.499 0.505 0.205 0.351 0.631
RM_CFO is a real earnings management proxy that negatively affects cash flows from operations. RM_PROD is a 
real earnings management proxy that negatively affects production. RM_DISX is a real earnings management proxy 
that negatively affects discretionary expenses. RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. 
Exec_Horizon is the subordinate executives’ decision horizon. Exec_PayRatio is the subordinate executives’ ability 
to influence the CEO. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, measured as the sum of the 
standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio.  CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. 
CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s 
portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is 
the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is 
the book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. 
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TABLE 2 
Pearson Correlation Table 
 
RM_CFO is a real earnings management proxy that negatively affects cash flows from operations. RM_PROD is a real earnings management proxy that 
negatively affects production. RM_DISX is a real earnings management proxy that negatively affects discretionary expenses. RM1 and RM2 are aggregate 
measures of real earnings management. Exec_Horizon is the subordinate executives’ decision horizon. Exec_PayRatio is the subordinate executives’ ability to 
influence the CEO. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, measured as the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and 
Exec_PayRatio.  CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the return on assets 
in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is 
the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. All correlations except those in shaded cells are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 RM_CFO 1.00
2 RM_PROD 0.48 1.00
3 RM_DISX -0.11 0.67 1.00
4 RM1 0.19 0.91 0.92 1.00
5 RM2 0.37 0.86 0.88 0.95 1.00
6 Exec_Horizon -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 1.00
7 Exec_PayRatio -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.07 1.00
8 Int_Governance -0.09 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 0.73 0.73 1.00
9 CEO_Horizon -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.16 0.04 0.14 1.00
10 CEO_Comp -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.05 -0.47 -0.35 -0.03 1.00
11 CEO_PPS -0.18 -0.10 0.01 -0.05 -0.08 0.12 0.29 0.28 -0.06 0.02 1.00
12 Firm_Age 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.26 -0.14 -0.27 -0.16 0.30 -0.14 1.00
13 N_Analyst -0.20 -0.11 0.00 -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.42 0.25 0.15 1.00
14 ROA -0.37 -0.31 0.00 -0.16 -0.19 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.14 -0.02 0.14 1.00
15 Size -0.02 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.10 -0.17 -0.06 -0.16 -0.11 0.65 0.12 0.48 0.61 -0.05 1.00
16 B/M 0.27 0.26 0.08 0.18 0.20 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.10 -0.21 -0.01 -0.27 -0.35 -0.06 1.00
17 Leverage 0.25 0.20 0.06 0.14 0.17 -0.12 -0.10 -0.14 -0.06 0.24 -0.16 0.27 0.05 -0.22 0.42 -0.13 1.00
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TABLE 3 
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management 
 
Pred.
H1
Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats
Exec_Horizon ― -0.072 -3.22 *** -0.147 -3.12 *** -0.111 -1.90 ** -0.252 -2.52 *** -0.178 -2.97 ***
Exec_PayRatio ― -0.329 -1.03 -2.141 -3.25 *** -3.042 -3.40 *** -5.141 -3.51 *** -3.524 -4.27 ***
CEO_Horizon -0.024 -1.15 -0.052 -1.28 -0.085 -1.77 * -0.137 -1.64 -0.101 -2.16 **
CEO_Comp -0.234 -0.90 -2.441 -4.44 *** -2.896 -4.53 *** -5.334 -4.71 *** -3.313 -5.36 ***
CEO_PPS -0.990 -1.52 -1.091 -0.63 -0.339 -0.16 -1.091 -0.30 -1.402 -0.64
Firm_Age 0.033 3.41 *** -0.050 -2.10 ** -0.088 -3.28 *** -0.134 -2.79 *** -0.050 -1.85 *
N_Analyst -0.151 -4.44 *** -0.396 -6.26 *** -0.432 -5.70 *** -0.831 -6.14 *** -0.575 -7.57 ***
ROA -35.760 -11.42 *** -49.310 -7.93 *** 16.170 2.72 *** -32.930 -2.86 *** -22.370 -3.18 ***
Size -0.510 -2.14 ** 3.631 7.80 *** 5.335 10.51 *** 8.890 9.75 *** 4.855 8.56 ***
B/M 4.723 8.17 *** 12.830 7.52 *** 10.800 6.28 *** 23.720 7.08 *** 15.120 8.10 ***
Leverage 10.550 7.70 *** 15.400 5.62 *** 8.046 2.65 *** 23.550 4.21 *** 18.350 6.15 ***
IMR -0.232 -0.31 -2.934 -1.96 ** -3.356 -2.10 ** -6.109 -2.10 ** -3.560 -2.02 **
Industry and Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.310 0.231 0.155 0.167 0.182
Observations 8,061 8,061 8,061 8,061 8,061
Pred.
H1
Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats
Int_Governance ― -0.345 -3.37 *** -1.001 -4.27 *** -1.043 -3.73 *** -2.014 -4.11 *** -1.401 -4.81 ***
CEO_Horizon -0.024 -1.17 -0.052 -1.27 -0.084 -1.75 * -0.136 -1.63 -0.100 -2.14 **
CEO_Comp -0.378 -1.59 -2.380 -4.65 *** -2.506 -4.36 *** -4.877 -4.68 *** -3.017 -5.21 ***
CEO_PPS -0.894 -1.32 -1.132 -0.65 -0.600 -0.29 -1.396 -0.39 -1.600 -0.74
Firm_Age 0.033 3.44 *** -0.050 -2.11 ** -0.089 -3.33 *** -0.136 -2.82 *** -0.051 -1.89 *
N_Analyst -0.149 -4.42 *** -0.397 -6.27 *** -0.436 -5.77 *** -0.835 -6.18 *** -0.578 -7.61 ***
ROA -35.750 -11.42 *** -49.310 -7.94 *** 16.150 2.73 *** -32.950 -2.87 *** -22.380 -3.18 ***
Size -0.443 -1.91 * 3.603 7.94 *** 5.153 10.48 *** 8.676 9.73 *** 4.717 8.40 ***
B/M 4.682 8.17 *** 12.850 7.56 *** 10.910 6.38 *** 23.850 7.15 *** 15.200 8.19 ***
Leverage 10.520 7.69 *** 15.420 5.64 *** 8.127 2.68 *** 23.650 4.24 *** 18.410 6.19 ***
IMR -0.206 -0.27 -2.945 -1.96 ** -3.427 -2.14 ** -6.192 -2.12 ** -3.614 -2.04 **
Industry and Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.309 0.231 0.155 0.166 0.182
Observations 8,061 8,061 8,061 8,061 8,061
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel B: Overall Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management
RM2RM_CFO RM_PROD RM_DISX RM1
Panel A: Key Executives' Decision Horizon, Power and Real Earnings Management
RM_CFO RM_PROD RM_DISX RM1 RM2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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TABLE 3 (Cont’d) 
Notes to Table 3: 
RM_CFO is a real earnings management proxy that negatively affects cash flows from operations. RM_PROD is a real earnings management proxy that 
negatively affects production. RM_DISX is a real earnings management proxy that negatively affects discretionary expenses. RM1 and RM2 are aggregate 
measures of real earnings management. All measures of real earnings management are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. Exec_Horizon is the 
subordinate executives’ decision horizon. Exec_PayRatio is the subordinate executives’ ability to influence the CEO. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall 
internal governance, measured as the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio.  CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. 
CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of 
the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in 
the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. IMR is the inverse mills 
ratio from the first-stage probit regression of just meet-or-beat earnings expectations on its determinants. Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and 
time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively 
(one-tailed test where there is a prediction, two-tailed test otherwise).  
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TABLE 4 
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management conditioning on Key Executives’ 
Contribution 
 
Pred.
H2
Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats
Int_Governance -0.437 -0.61 -0.542 -1.18
IND_RD 8.102 1.02 6.111 1.25
Int_Governance*IND_RD ― -3.308 -2.86 *** -1.924 -2.93 ***
CEO_Horizon -0.119 -1.18 -0.085 -1.54
CEO_Comp -5.693 -4.64 *** -3.706 -5.75 ***
CEO_PPS -0.442 -0.09 -0.584 -0.21
Firm_Age -0.178 -2.66 *** -0.064 -1.71 *
N_Analyst -0.907 -4.61 *** -0.573 -5.30 ***
ROA -45.540 -3.35 *** -27.400 -3.56 ***
Size 9.618 8.36 *** 5.113 7.68 ***
B/M 24.360 6.17 *** 15.730 7.42 ***
Leverage 21.760 3.43 *** 18.280 4.99 ***
IMR -6.460 -1.75 * -3.672 -1.63
Industry and Year FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.168 0.181
Observations 5,226 5,226
Pred.
H2
Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats
Int_Governance -1.255 -1.98 ** -0.833 -2.06 **
GEO_Complexy -12.820 -4.76 *** -6.939 -4.30 ***
Int_Governance*GEO_Complexy ― -1.253 -0.98 -0.989 -1.28 *
CEO_Horizon 0.033 0.29 -0.005 -0.07
CEO_Comp -4.986 -3.94 *** -3.066 -4.22 ***
CEO_PPS -1.685 -0.42 -1.898 -0.77
Firm_Age -0.179 -2.82 *** -0.075 -2.05 **
N_Analyst -0.910 -6.22 *** -0.601 -6.53 ***
ROA -30.420 -1.82 * -20.120 -2.10 **
Size 9.813 8.78 *** 5.346 7.73 ***
B/M 23.370 6.71 *** 15.220 7.89 ***
Leverage 30.620 5.94 *** 21.620 7.04 ***
IMR -8.472 -2.29 ** -4.097 -1.81 *
Industry and Year FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.188 0.200
Observations 4,943 4,943
RM1 RM2
Panel B: Factor Analysis of Geographical Operating Complexity
(1) (2)
RM1 RM2
Panel A: Industry Research and Development Intensity
(1) (2)
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TABLE 4 (Cont’d) 
Notes to Table 4: 
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of real earnings management are 
multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, measured as 
the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. IND_RD is an indicator equals one (zero) if 
the firm-year observation is in the top (bottom) tercile of industry research and development intensity. 
GEO_Complexy is an indicator equals one (zero) if the firm-year observation is in the top (bottom) tercile of the 
first principle component of the following three variables: 1) number of geographical segments; 2) geographical 
sales concentration and; 3) percentage of foreign sales. CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is 
the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of 
equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the return 
on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-
to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. IMR is the inverse 
mills ratio from the first-stage probit regression of just meet-or-beat earnings expectations on its determinants. 
Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (one-tailed test where 
there is a prediction, two-tailed test otherwise). 
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TABLE 5 
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management conditioning on Corporate 
Governance 
 
Notes to Table 5: 
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of real earnings management are 
multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, measured as 
the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. CORP_GOV is an indicator equals one 
(zero) if the firm-year observation is in the top (bottom) tercile of the first principle component of the following two 
variables: 1) percentage of independent directors and; 2) institutional ownership. CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s 
decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts 
following the firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in 
the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the 
current fiscal year. IMR is the inverse mills ratio from the first-stage probit regression of just meet-or-beat earnings 
expectations on its determinants. Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence 
(Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or 
better, respectively (one-tailed test where there is a prediction, two-tailed test otherwise).  
 
   
Pred.
H3
Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats
Int_Governance -0.772 -1.20 -0.516 -1.30
CORP_GOV -7.580 -3.02 *** -4.646 -3.14 ***
Int_Governance*CORP_GOV ― -2.326 -1.86 ** -1.389 -1.94 **
CEO_Horizon -0.139 -1.22 -0.098 -1.41
CEO_Comp -3.810 -3.49 *** -2.070 -3.23 ***
CEO_PPS -8.910 -1.96 * -5.839 -2.19 **
Firm_Age -0.139 -2.25 ** -0.058 -1.69 *
N_Analyst -0.741 -3.95 *** -0.533 -4.75 ***
ROA -19.190 -1.21 -11.400 -1.10
Size 8.668 7.71 *** 4.787 6.86 ***
B/M 23.680 5.81 *** 15.810 6.86 ***
Leverage 16.880 2.39 ** 14.460 3.63 ***
IMR -3.926 -0.76 -3.348 -0.98
Industry and Year FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.166 0.178
Observations 3,209 3,209
(1) (2)
RM1 RM2
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TABLE 6 
 Internal Governance and Accrual-based Earnings Management 
 
  
Pred.
Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats
Int_Governance +/― -0.193 -2.22 ** -0.121 -1.36 -0.027 -0.29
CEO_Horizon -0.025 -1.75 * -0.020 -1.39 -0.013 -0.87
CEO_Comp -0.496 -3.33 *** -0.322 -2.14 ** -0.137 -0.89
CEO_PPS -0.859 -1.68 * -0.807 -1.57 -0.663 -1.23
Firm_Age 0.035 4.33 *** 0.040 4.95 *** 0.041 5.20 ***
N_Analyst -0.062 -2.27 ** -0.032 -1.18 0.007 0.26
ROA 37.490 9.63 *** 38.710 10.31 *** 40.240 11.30 ***
Size 0.054 0.31 -0.258 -1.51 -0.509 -3.28 ***
B/M 4.323 6.76 *** 3.465 5.42 *** 2.510 3.99 ***
Leverage 2.397 2.50 ** 1.550 1.56 0.196 0.20
RM1 0.036 8.57 ***
RM2 0.120 13.08 ***
IMR 0.167 0.31 0.387 0.72 0.599 1.14
Industry and Year FE YES YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.134 0.149 0.195
Observations 8,005 8,005 8,005
Pred.
Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats
Int_Governance ― -1.887 -3.77 *** -1.269 -4.34 ***
CEO_Horizon -0.125 -1.50 -0.087 -1.86 *
CEO_Comp -4.533 -4.28 *** -2.685 -4.59 ***
CEO_PPS -1.015 -0.28 -1.124 -0.51
Firm_Age -0.153 -3.18 *** -0.072 -2.68 ***
N_Analyst -0.801 -6.03 *** -0.538 -7.40 ***
ROA -52.160 -4.40 *** -44.960 -6.06 ***
Size 8.571 9.94 *** 4.645 9.05 ***
B/M 21.460 6.42 *** 12.510 6.79 ***
Leverage 22.120 3.86 *** 16.870 5.53 ***
ACCEM 0.492 6.47 *** 0.590 8.43 ***
IMR -6.125 -2.11 ** -3.691 -2.17 **
Industry and Year FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.179 0.238
Observations 8,005 8,005
Panel A: Internal Governance and Accruals-based Earnings Management
Panel B: Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management
(1) (2)
RM1 RM2
ACCEMACCEMACCEM
(1) (2) (3)
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TABLE 6 (Cont’d) 
 
Notes to Table 6: 
ACCEM is the measure of discretionary accruals computed using the Modified Jones model, multiplied by 100 for 
the ease of exposition. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, measured as the sum of the 
standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp 
is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of 
equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the return 
on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-
to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. RM1 and RM2 are 
aggregate measures of real earnings management, multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. IMR is the inverse 
mills ratio from the first-stage probit regression of just meet-or-beat earnings expectations on its determinants. 
Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (one-tailed test where 
there is a prediction, two-tailed test otherwise). 
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TABLE 7 
 Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management - Instrumental Variables 
(2SLS) Approach 
 
Notes to Table 7: 
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of real earnings management are 
multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, measured as 
the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision 
horizon. CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of 
the CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the 
firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current 
fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current 
fiscal year. IMR is the inverse mills ratio from the first-stage probit regression of just meet-or-beat earnings 
expectations on its determinants. Outside_CEO is an indicator equals one if the current CEO is recruited from 
outside, and zero otherwise. Named_Exec is the number of named executives in the annual proxy statement besides 
the CEO.  Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 
2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (one-
tailed test where there is a prediction, two-tailed test otherwise).  
 
Pred.
H1
Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats
Predicted_Int_Governance ― -23.910 -3.47 *** -14.880 -3.56 ***
CEO_Horizon 0.017 4.11 *** 0.222 1.33 0.120 1.22
CEO_Comp -0.706 -13.04 *** -20.200 -3.90 *** -12.450 -3.96 ***
CEO_PPS 1.181 8.24 *** 24.840 2.48 ** 14.540 2.43 **
Firm_Age -0.010 -6.70 *** -0.354 -3.81 *** -0.185 -3.34 ***
N_Analyst 0.017 3.98 *** -0.429 -1.90 * -0.328 -2.45 **
ROA -0.724 -2.08 ** -51.470 -3.58 *** -33.770 -3.84 ***
Size 0.184 4.49 *** 12.570 6.99 *** 7.115 6.32 ***
B/M -0.256 -2.47 ** 18.290 4.06 *** 11.780 4.62 ***
Leverage -0.175 -1.01 19.500 2.59 *** 15.860 3.81 ***
IMR 0.008 0.08 -5.605 -1.41 -3.252 -1.34
Outside_CEO 0.249 5.03 ***
Named_Exec 0.065 3.48 ***
Industry and Year FE YES YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.320 0.176 0.190
Observations 8,061 8,061 8,061
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 16.65 *** 16.65 ***
(Weak identification test)
Hansen J-statistic 0.002 0.005
(Over-identification test of all instr.)
(2) (3)
RM1 RM2
(1)
Int_Governance
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TABLE 8 
 Alternative Measure of Key Executives' Power and Real Earnings Management 
 
Notes to Table 8: 
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of real earnings management are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. 
Other_Director is the number of independent directorships in other firms held by key subordinate executives. Exec_Horizon is the subordinate executives’ 
decision horizon. Exec_PayRatio is the subordinate executives’ ability to influence the CEO. CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the 
CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst 
is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal 
year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. IMR is the inverse mills ratio from the 
first-stage probit regression of just meet-or-beat earnings expectations on its determinants. Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (one-tailed test 
where there is a prediction, two-tailed test otherwise). 
Pred.
Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats
Exec_Horizon ― -0.279 -2.77 *** -0.194 -3.21 *** -0.264 -2.63 *** -0.184 -3.05 ***
Other_Director ― -2.718 -2.61 *** -1.381 -2.32 *** -2.672 -2.57 *** -1.350 -2.28 **
Exec_PayRatio ― -5.101 -3.45 *** -3.504 -4.21 ***
CEO_Horizon -0.150 -1.78 * -0.110 -2.32 ** -0.138 -1.65 * -0.102 -2.17 **
CEO_Comp -3.322 -3.59 *** -1.941 -3.83 *** -5.281 -4.61 *** -3.286 -5.26 ***
CEO_PPS -3.345 -0.94 -2.908 -1.36 -1.320 -0.37 -1.517 -0.70
Firm_Age -0.125 -2.57 ** -0.044 -1.62 -0.131 -2.73 *** -0.048 -1.79 *
N_Analyst -0.856 -6.53 *** -0.594 -8.02 *** -0.826 -6.22 *** -0.573 -7.65 ***
ROA -32.040 -2.80 *** -21.780 -3.10 *** -32.800 -2.86 *** -22.300 -3.17 ***
Size 8.280 9.17 *** 4.408 7.77 *** 9.047 9.92 *** 4.935 8.64 ***
B/M 24.180 7.24 *** 15.460 8.34 *** 23.570 7.05 *** 15.050 8.07 ***
Leverage 23.810 4.31 *** 18.560 6.29 *** 23.360 4.20 *** 18.250 6.15 ***
IMR -6.216 -2.14 ** -3.660 -2.08 ** -5.959 -2.05 ** -3.484 -1.97 **
Industry and Year FE YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.165 0.179 0.168 0.183
Observations 8,061 8,061 8,061 8,061
(3) (4)
RM1 RM2
(1) (2)
RM1 RM2
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TABLE 9 
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management conditioning on the passage of SOX 
 
Notes to Table 9: 
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of real earnings management are 
multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, measured as 
the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. Post_SOX is an indicator equals one if 
fiscal year is on or after 2002, and zero otherwise. CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the 
CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of 
equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the return 
on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-
to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. Time is a time trend 
variable which equals to the difference between the current fiscal year and 1992. IMR is the inverse mills ratio from 
the first-stage probit regression of just meet-or-beat earnings expectations on its determinants. Standard errors are 
corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (one-tailed test where there is a 
prediction, two-tailed test otherwise).   
Pred.
Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats
Int_Governance -1.037 -1.86 * -0.913 -3.09 ***
Post_SOX -2.705 -0.95 -1.403 -0.80
Int_Governance*Post_SOX ― -2.114 -3.09 *** -1.094 -2.88 ***
CEO_Horizon -0.143 -1.71 * -0.106 -2.26 **
CEO_Comp -5.125 -4.64 *** -3.195 -5.15 ***
CEO_PPS -1.443 -0.40 -1.815 -0.84
Firm_Age -0.144 -2.97 *** -0.055 -1.99 **
N_Analyst -0.848 -6.38 *** -0.571 -7.64 ***
ROA -32.420 -2.74 *** -21.150 -3.01 ***
Size 8.868 10.05 *** 4.804 8.47 ***
B/M 22.900 7.23 *** 14.630 8.07 ***
Leverage 23.130 4.21 *** 18.170 6.07 ***
Time -0.182 -0.84 -0.079 -0.52
IMR -7.360 -2.66 *** -3.844 -2.28 **
Industry FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.163 0.178
Observations 8,061 8,061
(1) (2)
RM1 RM2
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TABLE 10 
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management – Falsification Test 
 
Notes to Table 10: 
RM_CFO is a real earnings management proxy that negatively affects cash flows from operations. RM_PROD is a 
real earnings management proxy that negatively affects production. RM_DISX is a real earnings management proxy 
that negatively affects discretionary expenses. RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. 
All measures of real earnings management are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. Int_Governance is the 
firm’s overall internal governance, measured as the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and 
Exec_PayRatio.  CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. 
CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. 
N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is 
the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. 
Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. IMR is the inverse mills ratio from the first-stage probit 
regression of just meet-or-beat earnings expectations on its determinants. Standard errors are corrected for cross-
sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (one-tailed test where there is a prediction, two-
tailed test otherwise).  
 
 
 
Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats
Int_Governance -0.971 -1.15 -0.367 -0.69
CEO_Horizon -0.265 -1.79 * -0.178 -2.16 **
CEO_Comp -1.219 -0.90 -0.732 -1.12
CEO_PPS 0.832 0.09 0.671 0.12
Firm_Age -0.133 -2.53 ** -0.071 -2.26 **
N_Analyst -0.806 -2.87 *** -0.471 -2.88 ***
ROA 13.700 1.15 4.081 0.53
Size 8.118 4.89 *** 4.187 5.12 ***
B/M 11.190 7.07 *** 7.314 7.59 ***
Leverage 17.450 2.76 *** 17.100 5.19 ***
IMR -2.358 -0.66 0.286 0.12
Industry and Year FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.147 0.154
Observations 1,869 1,869
(1) (2)
RM1 RM2
